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In most urban cities across Australia, water restrictions remain the dominant policy 
mechanism to restrict urban water consumption.  The extensive adoption of water 
restrictions over several years means that Australian urban water prices have consistently 
not reflected the opportunity cost of water (Edwards 2008).  Given the generally strong 
political support for water restrictions and the likelihood that they will persist for some 
time, there is value in understanding householders’ attitudes in this context.  More 
specifically, identifying the welfare estimate associated with avoiding urban water 
restrictions entirely would be a non-trivial contribution to our knowledge of the costs that 
attend them.  This paper employs the results from the stated preference technique 
contingent valuation to investigate consumers’ willingness to pay to avoid urban water 
restrictions.  It also investigates the influence that cognitive and exogenous dimensions 
have on utility gain associated with avoiding water restrictions.  Accordingly, discussion 










In most urban cities across Australia, the level of rainfall is the key variable in 
determining the extent that water can be harvested for the urban population.  Water 
restrictions remain the dominant policy mechanism to restrict urban water consumption 
when rainfall falls short.  Economists are generally of the view that this type of allocation 
mechanism does not achieve economic efficiency.  Using water efficiently in an urban 
context requires that it be allocated to those users whom gain the highest marginal social 
value.  This is often not given priority in an urban water economy, with social and 
political objectives generally dominating decision making.  
 
Political constraints remain to be a barrier to improving economic efficiency of urban 
water use.  Notably, water restrictions constrain particular uses of water, but they do not 
require households to reduce the amount of water they use.  Therefore, water restrictions 
do not directly address the fundamental issue of ‘total use of water’ and furthermore they 
restrict householders’ freedoms regarding how they use their water.  Understandably, 
there is substantial conjecture about the positive and negative consequences of 
restrictions in the eyes of consumers.  Thus, increasing our knowledge of consumers’ 
preferences in regards to urban water restrictions appears to be important in developing 
effective policy responses. 
 
Politicians in support of water restrictions commonly try to gain the support of the public 
through playing the ‘moral suasion’ card.  Appeals are often made using the concept of 
‘intergenerational equity’, i.e. use less water to ensure water for your children.  In 
addition, the save every drop mentality campaign is often “used to beat urban consumers 
over the head” (Watson 2005, p.7).  Politicians claim that the public generally supports 
water restrictions and the punitive measures that attend them. A useful contribution may 
be to challenge the context of these claims.  For instance, are they being made on the 
assumption that the general public is attentive and knowledgeable about the national 
distribution of the resource and able to avail themselves of important information? Often, 
consumers are ignorant toward options and opportunities and this is apparent not only 
among the poor or the uneducated (Shafir 2007).   Arguably, there is ample evidence in 
the press and elsewhere that consumer knowledge of water is far from complete (see, for 
instance, Crase 2009). 
 
The seminal theoretical work on information highlighted that asymmetric information 
distorts the market equilibrium away from the first best (Akerlof 1970; Rothschild and 
Stiglitz 1976).  Stemming from the seminal works of Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1976), a comprehensive body of literature has emerged that emphasizes the 
negative welfare consequences of adverse selection and the potential for welfare-
improving government intervention (Chiappori and Salanie 2000; Finkelstein and 
McGarry 2006).   
 
Consideration of water restrictions in the context of legal governance is also important 
when making political assumptions about the public in general and developing urban 
water policy.  For instance, urban water restrictions are legally binding in the states of 
Victoria and New South Wales (NSW), Australia.  However, the jurisdiction governing  
this restriction mechanism largely differs between these two states.  For example, the 
fining process associated with a water restriction breach is less complex in NSW 
compared to that of Victoria.  This has lead to a greater number of householders in 
NSW’s capital city being fined compared to Victoria’s capital city.  Moreover, in 
Victoria the degree of punishment, as a consequence of a water restriction breach, 
becomes more severe as the restrictions tighten, whereas the punishment remains uniform 
in NSW across all stages of water availability.  In terms of the enforcement regime 
surrounding water restrictions, the number of water patrol officers per household in NSW 
is much greater than Victoria.  Thus, those who do not comply have a higher likelihood 
of getting ‘caught’ if they are a NSW resident. 
 
In the current context, understanding the value that consumers place on avoiding water 
restrictions would offer some insight into the welfare costs that are inflicted by water 
restrictions.  Moreover, investigating the influence that psychometric and exogenous 
variables have on the value estimates of avoiding water restrictions would be a useful 
contribution. 
 
This paper considers the welfare estimates associated with avoiding water restrictions by 
presenting the results of a contingent valuation (CV) study drawing data from NSW and 
Victoria.  The research also embodies data from water-rich and water poor communities 
and draws from regional and metropolitan settings.  Accordingly, the influence of these 
variables over the preferences of consumers can be considered. 
 
The paper itself is divided into four parts. Section two explores several aspects of choice 
behaviour covering economic, sociological and psychological dimensions.  In section 
three, we briefly consider the theoretical groundings of CV and present the design and 
results of this study.  More specifically, we report the empirical estimates of respondents’ 
willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid urban water restrictions. The final section addresses 
the core findings before offering some brief concluding remarks. 
 
2. An insight into economics: A traditional and behaviourist 
perspective 
The concept of relative scarcity has been seen to be the key factor underlying economics.  
Consumers’ unlimited wants and universally limited means with which to satisfy those 
implies the need for efficiency in their use (Wallis and Dollery 1999).  Efficiency, 
therefore, is a core consideration in the allocation of our resources.  Essentially, economic 
efficiency is thought to decrease the economic burden of scarcity across consumers.  In 
the current context, the achievement of economic efficiency is seen as reducing the 
relative scarcity of water and redistribute the burden of scarcity by controlling the 
allocation of water between consumer groups.  Behavioural economics develops this 
traditional perspective to improving allocative efficiency by considering the role that 
attitudinal variables play across consumer groups.  In essence, behavioural economics 
builds on the foundations established by neo-classical economics by incorporating a 
focus on the underlying psychological cognitions and, in turn, improve predictions of 
field phenomena and policy. 
  
It is important to note that this differing school of thought does not dismiss conventional 
economics where equilibrium, efficiency, and utility maximisation are central.  The 
traditional approach remains useful in that its theoretical framework provides us with 
refutable predictions.  Behavioural economics develops traditional economics in that it 
offers a greater psychological dimension and often simply relaxes basic assumptions that 
are not key to the economic field (Camerer et al. 2004).  Thus, it appears that considering 
psychological variables in the establishment of welfare estimates of avoiding water 
restrictions is, hypothetically at least, a key factor associated with calculations of 
expected utility. 
 
2.1 Choice behaviour: Attitudinal and exogenous factors 
Stern (2000) has developed an outline of causal variables for environmental behaviour.  
These include attitudinal factors, external or contextual forces, personal capabilities, and 
habit or routines.  Attitudinal factors include values, norms, beliefs, and attitudes.  These 
particular variables may affect the general behaviour of individuals or their specific 
behaviours.  There are a number of theories that underpin behavioural variance.  Namely, 
the cognitive dissonance theory of Festinger (1957), the norm-activation theory of 
Schwartz (1977), the new environmental paradigm (NEP) scale of Dunlop and Van Liere 
(1978), and the theory of planned behaviour
1.   
 
Secondly, the external or contextual forces are variables that are exogenous to 
individuals.  For instance, financial constraints, legal structures, regulations, a 
constrained physical environment, and community expectations are all influencing factors 
that are exogenous to the individual.  Notably, the way in which these factors impact on 
individuals’ behaviour is dependent on their beliefs and attitudes (Stern 2000). Therefore, 
it appears that the way in which water restrictions impact on an individual’s behaviour 
will be dependent on their beliefs and attitudes, at least in part. 
 
Thirdly, personal capabilities refer to the knowledge and skills that are required for 
certain behaviours.  A number of authors suggest that the explanatory power of socio-
demographic variables is relatively limited in the context of environmental behaviours 
(see, for instance, Bateman et al. 2002; Dietz et al. 1998; McFarlane and Boxall 2003).  
However, Stern (2000) claims that variables such as income, gender, age and educational 
level may be proxies for personal capacities.   
 
Finally, habits or routines also provide a set of variables that influence behaviour.  Stern 
(2000) acknowledge that habits and routines may need to be altered in order for 
behaviour to change.  However, this particular set of variables does not require 
substantial analysis in the current context as the focus of this study centres on rational, 
conscious choice behaviour. 
 
According to Stern (2000), these causal factors are not independent of each other, and 
environmental behaviours are dependent on a wide range of causal factors, both general 
                                                 
1 Armitage and Conner (2001) regard the theory of planned behaviour (TPB) of Ajzen (1991) and the 
theory of reasoned action (TRA) of Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) as the most widely researched model of the 
relationship between attitudes and behaviour.  
and behaviour-specific.  In addition, the literature suggests that attitudinal factors appear 
to demonstrate the greatest predictive power when behaviours are not extensively limited 
by context or personal capacities (see, for instance, Stern 2000; Tyler et al. 1982; Ajzen 
1991; Bamberg 2003).   
 
2.2 A closer look at the psychology of choice behaviour: The theory of 
planned behaviour 
The theory of planned behaviour is a model developed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1970) to 
predict an individual’s behaviour.  This model is embedded in a framework of learning 
theories and builds on the theory of propositional control (Dunlany 1967) and the theory 
of reasoned action (Ajzen and Fishbein 1970).  The theory of planned behaviour has 
proved effective in predicting behavioural intention and behaviour in a wide range of 
situations, including donating blood, safer sex behaviours, alcohol use and voting (Ajzen 
and Fishbein 1977; Bryan, Ruiz and O’Neill 2003; Sheppard, Hartwick and Warshaw 
1988).  The theory suggests that the intention to engage in a particular behaviour is a 
function of three antecedents: the attitude toward the behaviour, social norms, and 
perceived behavioural control.  The following discusses these in more detail. 
 
2.2.1 Attitudes 
D’Astous et al. (2005, p.292) defines attitudes as “an evaluative predisposition toward 
the behaviour as a function of its determinant personal consequences”.  That is, the 
individual’s attitude toward a particular behaviour is operationalised by the beliefs about 
the negative consequences and rewards associated with performing that behaviour (Ajzen 
and Fishbein 1970; Harrell 1991; Tolman, Edleson and Fendrich 1996).  The anticipated 
gain and loss related with a certain behaviour is measured against one another to aid in 
choosing the behaviour that minimises loss and maximises gain.   
 
The conclusions drawn from existing research into attitudes vary.  For instance, Aitken et 
al. (1994) suggests that attitudes have limited explanatory power regarding water 
consumption behaviour, although this result must be reviewed in relation to 
methodological concerns (see, for instance, Watson et al. 1999).  Moore et al. (1994) 
study of changes in community water conservation attitudes, knowledge, and behaviour 
intentions found significant correlation between reported behaviour attitudes, and 
intentions.  Thus, improving our understanding of knowledge, attitudes and intentions 
regarding urban water restrictions may potentially lead to an improvement in policy in 
the current context. 
 
2.2.2 Social norms 
Subjective norms are defined as “the perceived social acceptability of behaviour” 
(Kernsmith 2005).  Norms are usually limited to the social acceptability of the behaviour 
to people that are most significant to the individuals, however they may also include 
expectations by the society in general.  Social norms related to the acceptability of 
domestic water usage have been addressed in primary prevention campaigns involving 
television and radio commercials, billboards, and education efforts in schools that attempt 
to convey the message that excessive water use is unacceptable (DSE 2004). In the 
context of water usage, social norms are evolving.  Put simply, it is becoming  
increasingly unacceptable for consumers not to take responsibility for their own water 
consumption.  Arguably, the merit in this type of thinking is questionable. 
 
2.2.3 Perceived behavioural control 
Perceived behavioural control is an individual’s perception of the extent to which they 
believe they have the capacity (i.e. resources and opportunities) to achieve a behaviour in 
a successful way (d’Astous et al. 2005).  These expectations vary in their magnitude, 
generality and strength.  Basically, the theory proposes that an individual’s confidence in 
their ability differs across situations, with magnitude referring to the degree of difficulty 
to perform the behaviour, generality to the scope of situations that the behaviour may be 
necessary and strength refers to the individual’s degree of confidence (Kernsmith 2005).  
In the current context, the perception that individuals have of their perceived behavioural 
control regarding compliance with water restrictions may potentially impact on their 
preferences toward avoiding them. 
 
This discussion suggests that there is scope to address wider politico-economic 
considerations associated with urban water restrictions.  More specifically, it is plausible 
to identify individuals’ WTP to avoid restrictions and investigate how this interacts with 
psychological and exogenous variables and information about water management 
generally. 
 
3. Contingent valuation 
To further investigate householders’ preferences surrounding water restrictions, data were 
collected to specifically uncover the preference for avoiding restrictions entirely.  These 
data are considered in the context of the CV methodology. 
 
3.1 Bid  design 
Amongst the stated preference techniques the most extensively used approach is the 
contingent valuation (CV) method, which has been commonly employed to value 
preferences for environmental goods across numerous countries (Carson et al. 1995; 
Carson 2001).  In a CV method study, respondents are asked questions to elicit their 
maximum WTP or minimum willingness to accept compensation for a predetermined 
change.  A number of contingent valuation studies have used the multiple-bounded 
discrete choice (MBDC) response format as an alternative to the dichotomous choice 
format (Loomis and Ekstrand 1997; Welsh and Poe 1998; Poe et al. 2001; Cameron et al. 
2002; Roach et al. 2002; Alberini et al. 2003; Evans et al. 2003; Vossler et al. 2003). The 
MBDC approach increases the number of possible intervals to k+1 (where k is the 
number of bids shown to a respondent).  This approach improves the efficiency of the 
welfare estimate.  This research employed a payment card (MBDC) with an exponential 
response scale design that contained 13 cells.  The value given to respondents in the first 
cell was $0.  The values in the second cell through to cell twelve were computed by 
equation (1), 
 
Bn = B1 (1 + k) 
n-1     (1) 
  
In this case, Bn is the bid amount, where B1 equals 1 and k is determined by the range 
selected for the payment card.  The value of k is selected so that (1+k)
11 equals the largest 
value on the payment card i.e. (1.86)
11= 921
2.    Appendix A illustrates the bid design 
used for this study.  The bids range from $0 to $900 and have a k value of 0.86.  For ease 
of respondent review, the actual values listed on the payment card were rounded.   
Expressing a value of $900 instead of $921, or $40 instead of $41, is less distracting to 
respondents when they review the payment card, rarely has this had a significant effect 
on WTP summary statistics, and is not likely to be within the reporting precision of 
respondents (Rowe et al. 1996).  In this study, the MBDC format required respondents to 
indicate their voting certainty on a proposed policy referendum at each of the possible 
dollar values specified on the payment card (bids) by choosing from “definitely no”, 
“probably no”, “not sure”, “probably yes”, and “definitely yes” response alternatives. 
 
3.2 Data collection 
Six cities were selected to draw the sample for conducting the main survey, which was 
distributed on-line to a random sample of households.  These cities provided scope for 
analysis on several dimensions, including comparisons between water rich and water 
poor cities; Victorian and NSW cities; and regional and metropolitan cities.  Complete 
and valid information was gathered from 512 respondents (Wodonga: 54; Albury: 94; 
Melbourne: 106; Sydney:102; Goulburn: 51; Bendigo:105). Notably, the surveys were 
framed differently where half included information outlining the percentage of national 
water usage per sector and the remaining did not
3.  Sampling was completed during April 
2008.  The characteristics of the sample are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Sociodemographics of the Survey Respondents 
Metropolitan (Sydney, Melbourne)  40% 
Rural or Regional Centres (Albury, Wodonga, Goulburn, Bendigo)  60% 
New South Wales  48% 
Victoria 50% 
Average age  42 yrs 
Average household income before tax  $978 per week 





                                                 
2 The value k equals the percent increase between adjacent cells before smoothing of the values.  Cell 13 
includes the text ‘More than the above,’ which implies more than B12.   
3 The significance of this is investigated later in the paper by including the variable FACTS into the 
models.  
The questionnaire consisted of four parts.  The first part contained questions regarding 
respondents’ attitude toward water restrictions.  A choice-experiment was also presented 
to respondents in the second section and questions regarding the respondents’ socio-
economic status were presented in part three
4.  The final section was used to probe 
respondents about their WTP to avoid water restrictions. The focus of the remainder of 
this paper will be on the results and findings of the respondents WTP to avoid water 
restrictions. 
 
3.3 Ordered probit model 
There are a number of ways that have been proposed to retrieve the WTP from this form 
of data. Here we applied an ordered probit model
5 (see, for instance, Cameron et al. 
2002; Horna et al. 2007).  The central concept of an ordered probit model is that there is a 
latent continuous metric underlying the ordinal responses observed by the analyst.   
Thresholds partition the real line into a series of regions corresponding to the various 
ordinal categories.  The latent continuous variable, y *is a linear combination of some 
predictors,  x, the bid amount plus a disturbance term that has a standard Normal 
distribution: 
 
y*i = xi β + β0Bid + ei,       ei ~N(0, 1),i = 1, . . . , N. 
 
 
 yi, the observed ordinal variable for individual i, takes on integer values 0 through m 
according to the method below: 
 
 
yi = j      µj-1 < y*i ≤ µj, 
 
 
where j =0,…,m, and µ-1 = -∞, and µm = +∞, and the µj are defined as the ‘cut values’. 
 
To determine how changes in the predictors translate into the probability of observing a 
particular ordinal outcome consider the following:  
 
P[yi = 0] = P[µ-1 < y*i ≤ µ0], 
   = P[∞1 < y*i ≤ µ0], 
   = P[y*i ≤ µ 0], 
substituting from (1), 
   = P[xi β+ β0Bid+ ei ≤ µ 0],  
   = P[ei ≤ µ 0 - xi β- β0Bid], 
                                                 
4 See Cooper and Crase (forthcoming) for a review of the choice-experiment analysis conducted with this 
data. 
5 The ordered probit model was estimated using the data collected from the main survey instrument.  
   = Ф(µ 0 - xi β- β0Bid); 
P[yi = 1] = P[µ 0 < y*i ≤ µ 1], 
  = P[µ 0 < xi β + β0Bid + ei ≤ µ 1], 
  = P[µ 0 - xi β - β0Bid < ei ≤ µ 1 - xi β- β0Bid], 





P[yi = j] = Ф (µ j - xi β- β0Bid) - Ф (µ j-1 - xi β - β0Bid ). 
 
 
For j = m (the ‘highest’ category) the generic form reduces to: 
 
P[yi = m] = Ф (µ m - xi β- β0Bid ) - Ф (µ m-1 - xi β -β0Bid ), 
      = 1 - Ф (µ m-1 - xi β - β0Bid). 
 
 
A maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is used to estimate the model, thus initially a 
log-likelihood function is generated.  This is achieved by defining an indicator variable 
Zij , which equals 1 if yi = j and 0 otherwise.  The log-likelihood is simply
6: 
 







Zij ln[Ф ij - Ф i,j-1],   
 
 
where Ф ij = Ф [µ j - xi β- β0Bid] and Ф i,j-1 = Ф [µ j-1 - xi β -β0Bid]. 
       (Greene  1990) 
 
In the context of the current study, a further adjustment is required to account for the 
panel nature of the data: each respondent contributes 12 observations (associated with the 
12 bid amounts).  This can be dealt with by estimating a random effects ordered probit 
model, where the error term is modified such that:  
 
y*ki = xi β + β0Bidk + ζi + eki,         eki ~N(0, 1) , ζi ~N(0, 1) 
 
where ζi is an individual specific random effect, and k indicates the bid within the panel.  
The implication is that the responses are correlated for an individual, but are independent 
across individuals (Alberini et al. 2003). 
 
 
                                                 
6 The variance parameter was set to equal 1.   
3.4 Ordered probit results 
An ordered probit model was estimated for all respondents.  Table 2 summarizes the 
results of model 1, where significant socioeconomic and attitude items have been 
included in an attempt to improve model fit
7.   
 
                                                 
7 Refer to Appendix B for a description of the interaction variables.  
Table 2. Ordered Probit Model 
Model 1 
 Coefficient  t-ratio 
BID -0.0046  ***  43.46 
FACTS 0.2082  ***  3.29 
STATES 0.4147  ***  6.56 
WATER -0.2632  ***  3.51 
INCOME 0.0002  ***  4.31 
AGE -0.0094  ***  2.40 
EDUCATION -0.0879  ***  2.75 
NUMBER CHILDREN  -0.0972 ***  2.21 
POOL -0.1631  **  2.03 
INTENTION -0.2137  ***  3.68 
ATTITUDE 0.3140  ***  3.57 
SOCIAL NORMS  0.1669 ***  4.37 
VALUES -0.1294  ***  2.56 
PBC -0.3593  ***  7.19 
µ1  -1.2201 ***  5.07 
µ2  -0.7557 ***  3.15 
µ3  -0.2346   0.98 
µ4  0.4376   1.83 
N 6132 
Log Likelihood  -6267.202 
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. ** indicates significance at the 5 percent 
level. 
 
Model 1 indicates that the STATES, FACTS and INCOME parameters are positive and 
significant, which imply a number of relationships.  Firstly, respondents residing in NSW 
are WTP more to avoid water restrictions than Victorian respondents and implying they 
gain greater utility from avoiding regimes in that jurisdiction, ceteris paribus of course.  
Secondly, those respondents who received information (FACTS) regarding national water 
usage on their survey were inclined to offer a higher WTP.  Thirdly, higher income 
earners have a higher WTP to avoid water restrictions than lower income earners.   
Conversely, the WATER, AGE, EDUCATION, POOL and NUMBER CHILDREN 
parameters are negative and significant.  This suggests that participants from cities that 
have been on severe water restrictions for a long period of time are less WTP to avoid 
water restrictions compared to those respondents from cities that have a shorter history of 
water restrictions. In addition, respondents that are younger, have a lower level of 
education, do not own a pool and have a lower number of children residing in their  
household are more WTP to avoid water restrictions and therefore gain a higher utility 
from avoiding them.  These results support Syme and Nancarrow’s (1991) general 
observation that concerns surrounding perceptions of water restrictions are likely to be 
related to socio-economic status, age and household size, which may prompt strong 
emotions among water users. 
 
Attitude components were also included in the ordered probit model
8 in an attempt to 
increase our understanding of the cognitive, and perhaps more profound, influences over 
behaviour.  Model 1 indicates that INTENTION, VALUES and PBC have negative and 
significant coefficients, which has several implications.  Firstly, respondents that 
indicated a low intention to comply with water restrictions appear to be more inclined to 
pay to avoid water restrictions relative to those with higher intentions to comply.   
Secondly, respondents that expressed relatively low environmental values are generally 
more WTP to avoid water restrictions.  Thirdly, participants that scored low in terms of 
perceived behavioural control were also more inclined to use a monetary vehicle to avoid 
water restrictions.  Put differently, those that believe that the actions of their individual 
household will not influence the overall water situation are generally more WTP to avoid 
water restrictions.  On the other hand, ATTITUDE and SOCIAL NORMS
9 have positive 
and significant coefficients.  Perhaps controversially, respondents with a favourable 
attitude toward complying with water restrictions appear more WTP to avoid them than 
those with a less favourable attitude.  The SOCIAL NORMS variable attempts to act as a 
proxy for participants’ ranking of social norms i.e. the extent to which the respondent 
views compliance as ‘appropriate behaviour’ in a social context.  The data thus support 
the view that those who scored higher in terms of SOCIAL NORMS were more inclined 
to pay to avoid water restrictions.   
 
3.5   WTP to avoid water restrictions  
The definition of the median WTP is complicated if the central category is unsure.  In 
such cases one can only say that the median WTP lies within a bound.  These are defined 
in this case as:  
 
WTPl =  (xi β- μ3 )/β0 
and  
WTPu =  (xi β- μ2 )/β0 
 
where l and u indicate lower and upper bounds respectively.  Given the inclusion of the 
respondent-specific exogenous variables xj, the WTP values can be evaluated either at the 
means, or at specific values.  One view of these bounds is that they represent alternative 
interpretations of the value needed to achieve a majority in a referendum: the lower 
assumes that the majority can include only those who say “definitely yes” and “probably 
yes”, while the upper bound considers those who respond both “yes” and “uncertain”.   
 
                                                 
8 Six attitude components were estimated from 30 scale items included in the survey, where the extraction method 
employed was principal axis factoring.  Refer to Appendix B: Table 2 for a description of these variables. 
 
9 For a more detailed explanation of the derivation of these items see Cooper (forthcoming).  
The median WTP for all respondents was estimated from the sample data and the 
estimated coefficients from Model 1.  This range is not a statistical significance concern, 
rather the WTP of -$4.86 represents the conservative estimate and the WTP of $107 
represents a liberal estimate (see Table 3).    
 
Table 3. WTP per annum All Respondents 
 WTP  t-ratio 
Lower bound (Conservative)  -$4.86  -0.64 
Upper bound (Liberal)  $107.06  14.55*** 
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.  
 
 
In addition, Graph 1 is derived from the estimated coefficients from Model 1 and 
illustrates the predicted probabilities for each class (definitely no; probably no; unsure; 
probably yes; definitely yes) of the latent variable for each of the bid amounts.  Framing 
this information as a referendum, we can also determine the range where the WTP will 
fall for the median respondent. 
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A number of unconditional median WTP values were estimated along situational 
dimensions in order to make meaningful comparisons within the sample data. Table 4 
below presents the range for the unconditional Median WTP across three dimensions.  
Firstly, the WTP range is presented for NSW respondents compared to Victorian 
respondents.  As observed earlier, NSW participants are generally more WTP to avoid 
water restrictions than Victorians, where, even from the conservative perspective, NSW 
respondents are WTP $45.  Notably, this may, in part, be explained by the vastly different 
enforcement regimes associated with water restrictions across the two states.  For 
instance, Victoria has a less stringent regime and therefore Victorian respondents may not  
perceive there to be as much value in paying to avoid water restrictions as they are not as 
heavily enforced as those in NSW. 
 
Secondly, Table 4 enables us to compare the WTP range for water rich cities with water 
poor cities.  That is, those cities that have a history of severe water restrictions compared 
to those that have been faced with less severe restrictions or restrictions more recently.  
Respondents from water poor cities have a lower WTP range.  This may, in part, be 
explained by the notion that consumers adapt to changing circumstances (Seligman et al. 
1996).  Thus, residents in water poor cities may have invested in gardens that demand 
less water or alternative water supplies, and hence might be expected to gain a lower 
utility from avoiding water restrictions.  Moreover, Krannich et al. (1995) suggests that 
severe and long-term scarcity can seriously strain the response capabilities of individuals.  
Therefore, the notion of ‘water restriction fatigue’ may also contribute to the explanation 
of this result
10 where, in some instances, consumers in water poor cities have developed 
an indifferent attitude toward water restrictions altogether.  
 
Finally, the WTP range is presented for those respondents who received information 
pertaining to national water use compared to those who did not.  The data reveals that 
those who received this information had a higher WTP.  Notably, participants that 
received this information indicate a WTP value of $21 from the conservative perspective, 
with the upper bound estimating a WTP of $133.  This suggests that there may be merit 
in further investigating whether differing amounts of information will alter people’s 
preferences to tolerate water restrictions.  For instance, ‘to what extent are the people 
who generally support water restrictions decisions cognizant of the national distribution 
and use of the resource?’   
 
                                                 
10 This concept became apparent during interviewing residents from cities that had been on severe water 
restrictions for a long period of time (i.e. Bendigo, Goulburn).  A number of interview participants revealed 
a diminishing enthusiasm for water restrictions due to the extensive length of time they had been inflicted 
upon them.  
Table 4. Unconditional Median WTP Ranges 
  States 
  NSW  t-ratio Vic t-ratio 
Lower bound  $45.09  4.84*** -$55.80 -5.10*** 
Upper bound  $157.02  16.78*** $56.13  5.35*** 
       
  Water 
  Water Rich  t-ratio  Water Poor  t-ratio 
Lower bound  $19.76  2.39** -$63.22  -4.35*** 
Upper bound  $131.69  16.12*** $48.71  3.45*** 
      
  Facts 
  No t-ratio Yes t-ratio 
Lower bound  -$8.29  0.76  $21.17  2.11** 
Upper bound  $103.63  9.69*** $133.11  13.47*** 
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. ** indicates significance at the 5 percent 




4.  Discussion and concluding remarks 
People’s sensitivity to water restrictions across a number of dimensions appears to differ 
between groups within the population.  Being able to identify the segments within the 
population who are most enthusiastic about paying to avoid water restrictions is an 
important element to developing effective policy. 
 
Contrary to the implied value of ‘saving water’ that dominates popular thinking, 
discussion reveals that particular segments within society actually value not being subject 
to water restrictions.  More specifically, attitudinal variables (e.g. attitudes toward social 
norms) and particular value sets (e.g. environmental values) were proven to play some 
part in influencing an individual’s WTP to avoid water restrictions.  Similarly, 
respondents that differ across socio-demographic variables such as age, income and 
education also appear to receive differing levels of utility from avoiding water 
restrictions.  In addition, exogenous factors such as a respondents’ state jurisdiction, the 
severity and duration of water restrictions imposed within their city and whether the 
respondent received information about overall national water usage were shown to have 
an influence on the respondent’s WTP to avoid water restrictions.  Interestingly, across 
some of these situational dimensions it appears that respondents do not prima facie gain  
utility from avoiding water restrictions and across others the impact of water restrictions 
on human welfare is self evident.   
 
The policy implications of this analysis are significant. Presently, state jurisdictions 
impose a range of constraints to limit household water use with little account for 
individual preferences or use.  Clearly, this approach is not unanimously supported by the 
population, although many would appear to be in favour of more rigorous application 
across the populous simply for the sake of it (see Cooper and Crase forthcoming).  By 
way of contrast, the CV data show that more rigorous enforcement- such as that applied 
in NSW- is also linked to a greater inclination to pay to avoid restrictions.  Moreover, 
when individuals have access to information about national water consumption trends 
they are more inclined to seek to ‘buy their way out’ of the restriction regime.  All of 
these topics are worthy of greater scrutiny in a policy context and provide a useful basis 
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Appendix A: Bid Design 
 
 
Given your household’s income and other expenses, we would like you to think about 
whether or not you would be willing to make an annual payment so your household 
would not be subject to water restrictions.  This amount would be listed as a separate item 
on one of your water bills for the year. 
 
For each of the amounts below, please indicate your willingness to pay to avoid 
water restrictions.    
  Willingness to Pay? 




0 A  B  C  D  E 
$2 A  B  C  D  E 
$3 A  B  C  D  E 
$6 A  B  C  D  E 
$12 A  B  C  D  E 
$20 A  B  C  D  E 
$40 A  B  C  D  E 
$80 A  B  C  D  E 
$150 A  B  C  D  E 
$250 A  B  C  D  E 
$500 A  B  C  D  E 
$900 A  B  C  D  E 
















VARIABLES  DESCRIPTOR  LEVELS/CODING 
AGE  4 stage scale 
18 to 24=1 
25 to 54=2 
55 to 64=3 
65+ =4 
WATER  Do respondents live in a 




Did respondents receive facts 
outlining national water usage 
on their survey 
Yes=1 
No=0 
















EDUCATION  Highest level of education 
completed 
Year 10 at secondary college=1 
Year 12 at secondary college=2 




The number of children in 
their household 
None=0 
1 or 2=1 
3 or 4=2 
5+ =3 
POOL  Do respondents have a pool 
Yes=1 









Intention to comply with 
water restrictions: where 
increased intention implies 
greater intention to comply 
with water restrictions. 
“I intend to follow 
water restrictions in 
the future” 
Factor Score: 4 intention 
questions (5 stage Likert 




Attitude toward water 
restrictions: where an 
increase in this variable 
implies a more favourable 
attitude toward complying 
with water restrictions. 
“I think it is a good 




toward social norms: where 
increased social norms 
implies a greater concern 
for behaving ‘appropriately’ 
according to society‘s 
norms. 
“Most members of 
my family think I 
should comply with 
water restrictions” x 
“Generally speaking, 
I want to do what 
most members of my 
family think I should 
do” 
Factor score: 11 Attitude 
questions (5 stage Likert 
scale) were reduced to 2 
variables- ATTITUDE and 
SOCIAL NORMS 






implies stronger values for 
the environment. 






Compliance Values in 
general: where increased 
compliance values implies 
stronger values for 
complying with the law in 
general. 
“Generally, I feel that 
I have a duty to 
comply with the law” 
Factor score: 8 Attitude 
questions (5 stage Likert 
scale) were reduced to 2 





control over the national 
water situation: where 
higher PBC implies higher 
perceived control. 
“It won’t make any 
difference if my 
household does not 
comply with water 
restrictions” 
Factor Score: 7 intention 
questions (5 stage Likert 
scale) were reduced to a 
single PBC variable. 
 